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A Critical Analysis of African-Centered Psychology:
From Ism to Praxis
A. Ebede-Ndi

California Institute of Integral Studies
San Francisco, CA, USA
The purpose of this article is to critically evaluate what is perceived as shortcomings in the
scholarly field of African-centered psychology and mode of transcendence, specifically in
terms of the existence of an African identity. A great number of scholars advocate a total
embrace of a universal African identity that unites Africans in the diaspora and those on
the continent and that can be used as a remedy to a Eurocentric domination of psychology
at the detriment of Black communities’ specific needs. Another group of scholars argue
for a relative African identity, emphasizing diversity and differences among African people
both on the continent and in the diaspora. Considering that the earlier works in the field
focused on laying its ideological foundation, this paper suggests that African-centered
psychology and mode of transcendence should: (a) move beyond discussions on ideologies
and identities, (b) concentrate on developing practical applications of its guiding principles,
and (c) reclaim the relevance of an African history, memory, and past. In other words,
having reclaimed African history, memory, and past, African-centered psychology can move
away from ism and advance toward more praxis..
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n their overview of transpersonal psychology’s growth
trajectory, Hartelius, Caplan, and Rardin (2007)
reflected that “the growing transpersonal community
could benefit greatly from transpersonal associations
throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America—not so
Westerners might come as missionaries and teach the
transpersonal, but because the Western community
needs the participation of these communities” (p. 17). In
addition, they argued that “if transpersonal psychology
aspires to be a fully integrative human psychology, a
psychology that is not only East-West but also NorthSouth, it will need to invite voices from the rest of the
world” (p. 17). Towards the purpose of redressing this
imbalance, this article presents an overview of the field
of African-centered psychology/studies and mode of
transcendence. The focus here is not to describe specific
African-centered transpersonal phenomena, but to
critically evaluate the field and offer suggestions for a
more practical direction.
This article aims not only to engage scholars
within the field of African-centered psychology, but
also to inform psychologists of non-African-centered
descent of the literature and praxis in the said field, and
argue for more professional attention within the field

of psychology to the needs of Black communities and
the ways to address those needs. Embedded in this
discussion is the premise that one cannot argue for the
relevance of an African-centered psychology without an
a priori recognition of the existence of an African history,
memory, and past. The following section attempts to
define key concepts that are relevant to understand the
history of and the discussion within the scholarly field of
African-centered psychology.
The Question of an African Identity
here are opposing views about the existence of
an African identity and the nature of an Africancentered psychology. Africa is a continent of 54 countries,
and each country has its own tribes and cultures; it
is then not possible to describe an African-centered
psychology that represents all Africans. However, in
order to understand the conversation around the idea of
an African-centered psychology, it is necessary to define
related concepts. A quick search of the term “Africancentered” redirects one to the notions of “Afrocentrism,”
“Afrocentricity,” or “Africology,” which is the study of
Black, African, African American, Africana and/or AfroAmerican.
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Afrocentrism or Afrocentricity
The term Afrocentrism is believed to have
originated in 1962 (Moses, 1998) and Afrocentricity in
the 1970s (Thairu & Wahinya, 1975). Both terms are
used essentially as a cultural ideology or worldview by
mostly African Americans and Africans of the diaspora.
Even though Afrocentric ideas may date back at least to
the 1890s (Conyers, 2004), the concept was revived in
the 1960s and 1970s. African American intellectuals,
inspired by African-centered scholars’ groundbreaking
works of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
(i.e., Du Bois, 1903, 1915, 1933, 1939; Fanon, 1952, 1961;
Guthrie, 1976; Jones, 1972; Nobles, 1974), and motivated
by the Civil Rights movement and the development of
African American Studies programs in universities in
the United States, sought self-determination through the
rehabilitation of their African cultural heritage.
The term Afrocentric has been traced by
Derrick Alridge to W. E. B. Du Bois who used it in
the 1960s, but it was Asante who appropriated the term
and popularized it in Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social
Change (1980) and later in The Afrocentric Idea (1998).
Asante (2000) stated that the Afrocentric idea as a cultural
configuration was distinguished by five characteristics:
1. An intense interest in psychological location
as determined by symbols, motifs, rituals, and
signs
2. A commitment to finding the subject-place of
Africans in any social, political, economic, or
religious phenomenon with implications for
questions of sex, gender, and class
3. A defense of African cultural elements as
historically valid in the context of art, music,
and literature
4. A celebration of centeredness and agency
and a commitment to lexical refinement that
eliminates pejoratives about Africans or other
people
5. A powerful imperative from historical sources
to revise the collective text of African people.
Akbar (1991) argued that Afrocentricity involves
the identification of the continuous ancient voice in its
call to a realization of an authentic African people. His
aim was to develop an African agency that does not derive
from the negative aspects of being “Black” people on the
continent or anywhere in the diaspora. He emphasized
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the positive features of basic African philosophy that
dictate the values, customs, attitudes, and behaviors of
Africans in Africa and in the New World (Nobles, 1980),
and the reclamation, re-ascension, and revitalization of
an African psychology (Noble, 1986).
The end of slavery in the United States in the
1860s and the decline of colonialism in Africa in the
1960s were major social changes that created conditions
for the rise of Black consciousness around the world.
But it was in the United States that such changes
received transformational impetus. African American
intellectuals, who constantly lived under Euro-American
organized racism and repression, needed to develop
a counter-narrative where they could self-determine.
Afrocentrism became a counter-narrative that seeks to
highlight the contributions of African people worldwide
(Asante, 1980, 1998, 2000).
Critique of Afrocentrism
Afrocentrism is generally defined as the study
of African peoples using an Africa-centered lens. The
problem with this definition is the placement of Africa
at the center of any analysis of African history and
culture, including the African American experience
(Oyebade, 1990). Conflating the African and African
American experience could present some methodological
challenge. For example, in the early 1960s, Africacentered historiography scholars consciously grounded
their research in African methodology; but, Oyebade
(1990) argued, “the theoretical conceptualization of an
Africa-centered approach is the handiwork of Afrocentric
scholars such as Molefi Kete Asante, Tsheloane Keto,
Mualana Karenga, and a host of others based in the
United States” (p. 233). Shifting the focus from
methodology to theory may open the field to different
kinds of ideological interpretations. Yet, what the field
needs today is to move away from ideological ism and
focus more on methodological praxis.
Critics argued that Afrocentrism, as an ideology,
offers little more than “a psychological and therapeutic
feel-good-together philosophy” (Adeleke, 2009, p.
180) or a new reconstruction of world history full of
historical myths and legends (Shavit, 2001). Cain Hope
Felder (1994) warned Afrocentrists not to demonize
categorically all white people, vilify European heritage
to the point that Europe epitomizes all the evil in the
world, and that gross over-generalizations and using
factually or incorrect material is bad history and bad
scholarship. Despite the critics’ opinion, Afrocentrism
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is an important aspect of a Pan-African conversation
about the identity and the relevance of the knowledge of
Africans on the continent and in the diaspora.
Pan-Africanism and the Diaspora
Pan-Africanism is an ideology and movement
that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide.
It is based on the belief that unity is vital to economic,
social, and political progress and aims to “unify and
uplift” people of African descent. In psychology,
Pan-Africanism could be understood as the common
lived experience, felt emotion, and shared memory of
African people on the continent and in the diaspora.
In his definition of diaspora, Safran (1991) said that its
constituent elements include:

This definition illustrates the motivating
sentiment behind the Pan-African movement of the early
twentieth century. Pan-African ideas could be traced
back to the first resistance on the slave ships—rebellions
and suicides—through the constant plantation and
colonial uprising and the “Back to Africa” movements of
the nineteenth century (PADEAP, 2011), and emerged as
a distinct political movement initially formed and led by
people from the diaspora who focused on the struggles of
the African people against enslavement and colonization.
The use of diaspora emerges directly out of the
growing scholarly interest in the Pan-African movement
in particular, and in Black Internationalism in general,
that began to develop in the 1950s. The need for the
reunification of diasporic and continental Africans was
expressed decades earlier (Du Bois, 1933). This movement
was born out of the necessity to confront or heal the slavery
legacy through racial organization: through ideologies of
a real or symbolic return to Africa (Edwards, 2001). In this
way, Africans of the diaspora imagined a unified identity
that was dependent on a common relationship to Africa.
In 1900, Henry Sylvester Williams from Trinidad
called a conference that took place in London, UK, to
protest the stealing of the lands in the colonies, racial
discrimination, and other relevant issues of interest to

Blacks (PADEAP, 2011). In 1919, an African American,
W. E. B. Du Bois, convened the first Pan-African
congress in Paris, France, demanding the independence
of African nations. Further congresses—essentially
extended meetings of like-minded Africans searching for
a way forward—were held in 1921 in London, Brussels,
Paris, in 1923 in London and Lisbon, and in 1927 in New
York (PADEAP, 2011). Arguably, the most important
Pan-African congress was held in 1945 in Manchester
where a large number of African representatives
from the continent attended for the first time, which
resulted in a gained momentum that contributed to
the independence movements of the 1950s and 1960s.
Throughout the twentieth century, cultural PanAfricanism weaved through the political narrative—
the Harlem Renaissance, Francophone philosophies
of Négritude, Afrocentrism, Rastafarianism and Hip
Hop (PADEAP, 2011)—advocating self-determination
of Blacks. In 1974 the 6th Pan-African Congress took
place in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, fueled by the radical
Black movements that swept the diaspora, espousing
militant Black pride, fighting White domination with
Black separatist organization, and advocating the global
unity of Black people struggling for liberation. The
7th Congress in Kampala, Uganda, in 1994 set up a
permanent organizational structure to carry forward
decisions taken at the Congress meetings. There were
and still are inherent divisions and debates within
the Pan-African movement, according to PADEAP
(2011): is Pan-Africanism a movement of the people or
has it now been taken over by governments, are Black
Africans of Sub-Saharan origin the only true Africans?
Pan-Africanism may not be different from any other
broad-based and passionate political movement,
namely the Black Lives Matter movement in the USA.
Critique of (Pan) African Identity
At the heart of the Pan-African debate is the
question of an African identity. Scholars argue that
the very idea of an African identity is a conflation; it
is the main fallacy upon which the concept of an
African diaspora largely depends on for its validation
(Hartman, 2007; Mengestus, 2007). African identities,
such as African languages, are inventions, mutually
constitutive existential and epistemic constructions:
“Invention implies a history, a social process; it
denaturalizes cultural artifacts and practices, stripping
them of primordial authenticity and essentialism”
(Zeleza, 2006, p. 14). The idea of Africa is complex
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Dispersal from a homeland, often by violent forces,
the making of a memory, and a vision of that
homeland, marginalization in the new location, a
commitment to the maintenance/restoration of the
homeland, and desire for return and a continuing
relationship and identity with the homeland that
shapes the consciousness and solidarity of the group.
(pp. 83-84)

and any attempt to define it may swing unsteadily
between the poles of essentialism and contingency.
The essentialist pole comes from a critique of
racial purity in Euro-America and posits that Africa
arises from similarly complex crossings across race
and ethnicity. With this stance, some scholars may
argue, Du Bois (1915, 1939) may be taking interethnic
crossing to be as identity-constituting and identityfracturing as interracial crossing. The flip side of that
argument, they might say, is the view that imposes a
model of racial homogeneity onto ethno-diversity,
flattening important differences among various African
people, and underscoring the question of who is the
only true African. However, this position may be
shortsighted especially when looked at it through the
lens of postmodern essentialism. When Du Bois (1903)
discussed the notion of double consciousness he was
suggesting that Blacks were simultaneously inside and
outside the West and developed two senses of self: one
from within their respective communities and the other
from a larger Eurocentric dominant culture. This double
consciousness may not only apply to the perceptions
and representations related to interracial and interethnic
crossings but could be applied to interracial marriages
as well. The general point Du Bois was making with
his color-line theory was to reflect on the role of race
and racism in history and society, calling the world’s
attention to an eventual response of the oppressed,
who happened to be people of color to the oppressors,
who happened to be Whites or people of European
descent. Such an argument did not necessarily
contradict Du Bois’ Pan-African ideas and demand
for the liberation of African nations and Black (color)
people everywhere, on the contrary, it confirmed it.
On the other hand, the contingency pole
comes from a critique of racial homogeneity in Africa
and posits that DNA research may show that Africans
are more diverse than homogeneous and cannot be
used to support the Pan-African ideas of an African
identity and/or common lived experience. Keguro
(2008) argued that the promise of DNA testing for
many diasporic people is that it might reveal where their
ancestors may once have lived and loved, traveled and
married. Such research, this view maintains, tells one
more about movement and travel. It tells a contingent
story: at this moment, in this year, this individual was
in this place—and in telling such a story it opens up
narrative possibilities. How did this person come to be
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in this place at this particular time? What kind of life
situation allowed this person to travel to, live in, love
in, or be captured in this place? Instead of focusing on
place and the mobility of people, DNA research should
give insight into the practices of community formation
and re-formation: siblings who traveled together and
apart to form unique and related family groups; ethnogroupings that are occasional, disrupted, and disruptive
(Keguro, 2008). Therefore, one might discover that
Africans are more continental, more multi-ethnic, and
less rooted and homogeneous than they imagine. In
such a scenario, Keguro concluded, diasporic African
researches into and complications of identity have much
to teach some Africans about their own forms of diversity,
about the historically situated aspect of how they have
come to be specific, and the stories of how they have
always been more diverse than they imagine or claim.
The point Keguro made could be used to
debunk the essentialist argument of imposing racial
homogeneity onto ethnic diversity by showing that PanAfricanism is more heterogeneous than homogeneous.
However, what Keguro is not addressing is that the
problem of an African identity is not necessarily
one of diversity but is one of validity and selfdetermination. DNA focus on place is one aspect,
contingent practices of community formation and
re-formation is another. DNA findings and research
in community practices may lead to the development
of praxis that would contribute to the rehabilitation
of an African history and memory, the legitimation
of an African knowledge, and the validation of an
African science, regardless of how heterogeneous or
homogeneous African people are. Such praxis “cannot
be something imposed from above, but must be found
in the authentic lives of the people as they maintain
their own sense of dignity” (Asante, 2009, p. 3).
Diasporic and continental African relationships
are nuanced and finding a historical, political, and
cultural unity can be challenging. On the one hand,
Du Bois and Safran assumed that there is a nationalistic
tie that binds all “Negro peoples” together by virtue of
some inherently shared relationship to Africa. On the
other hand, Hartman and Mengestus critiqued this link
that supposedly ties the diaspora together. For example,
Hartman (2007) argued that the simplistic reduction
involved in defining a diasporic community with an
identifiable kinship to “an African continental family”
(p. 6) is one that exists in a constructed realm dependent
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on the concept of race which was “developed in the
modern period and in the context of the slave trade”
(p. 5). Mengestus (2007) presented a more nuanced
view that neither agrees nor disagrees with this imagined
racial connection and instead takes a middle ground
position and acknowledges the complexly different
trajectories of the continent’s many languages and
cultures. Nevertheless, the question of race and kinship
between diasporic and continental Africans becomes
obsolete once one recognizes that there was an Africa
before slavery and colonization, which had a history
and memory. The wisdom and knowledge contained in
the many languages and cultures of the continent could
then lay the foundation for Africa’s ability for knowledge
production in service of humanity:
Contrary to popular perceptions, Black psychology,
as being developed in the United States, is neither
narrowly race-specific nor limited ethnically or
geographically. It is the self-conscious “centering”
of psychological analyses and applications in
African realities, cultures, and epistemologies.
(Nobles, 2013, pp. 292-299)
Although the subject of African identities is vast
and complex as the continent itself, it could become a
distraction. For methodological purposes, one could
select an area of research and develop appropriate
praxis. For example, there are religious, ecological,
linguistic, and even ethnic taxonomies. There is
also Africa as biology/racial, image/representational,
space/geographical, and memory/historical (Zeleza,
2006). Africa as memory is relevant for this article as
it represents a racial, representational, and geographical
link between diasporic and continental Africans, who
share similar experiences and related cultural and
historical worldviews. Diasporic or African Americans
have experienced slavery, involuntary relocation, social
and racial discrimination and alienation in the new
land. Continental Africans have experienced slavery,
colonization, and alienation in their own land. Both are
experiencing a global despise and/or rejection of their
very existence, arguably, and maybe solely, based on how
they look, behave, and possibly their skin color. This
commonly lived experience could explain their strong
emotional attachment to their shared memory expressed
in Pan-Africanism or today’s Black Lives Matter
movement and other related emancipatory movements
and could not just be mere inventions.

African-Centered Psychology

Eurocentric Critique
of African-Centered Studies
frican-centered studies or African studies focus on
studying African cultures and communities and also
work for the knowledge and emancipation of the African
people. The field includes essentially the study of history:
pre-colonial (before the 19th century), colonial (between
19th and 20th centuries), and post-colonial (after WWII,
in the 1950s, 1960s, and beyond); demography: ethnic
and tribal groups; religion: Christianity, Islam, traditional
religions; culture, politics, economy, and languages. The
main approach is critical, questioning epistemological
paradigms, theories, and methods used in traditional/
mainstream disciplines and how they relate to African
ways of knowing and/or references. In general, Africancentered studies are interdisciplinary, comprehensive,
and appropriately designed to tackle the complexity of
issues related to African-centeredness.
Considering the background and context of the
concepts previously defined, it seems more appropriate
to talk about African-centered studies in a much broader
sense than to talk about African-centered psychology
more specifically. The diversity of the African people
around the world warrants a complex approach to
study their reality. Such approach was hinted at in
the definition of Afrocentrism and Pan-Africanism.
These concepts revealed intersections between history,
psychology, anthropology, sociology, philosophy, and
even political science.
One may not be able to fully describe Africancentered studies without a priori acknowledging the
existence of an African history and memory, recognizing
the validity of African knowledge, and denouncing the
negative effect of colonialism and to some extent slavery
on the African people and their knowledge. Such
efforts were attempted in Pan-African and Afrocentric
movements. However, one of the main critiques of
Afrocentric scholars was their alleged falsification of
African/Black history and their “bad scholarship.”
This critique, as fair as it may sound, forces one to
reflect on its possible implicit assumption. Africans
have been made to believe that they do not possess
the tools and knowledge to write their own history:

A

The Negro…exhibits the natural man in his
completely wild and untamed state. We must lay
aside all thought of reverence and morality – all that
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we call feeling – if we would rightly comprehend
him; there is nothing harmonious with humanity to
be found in this type of character. (Hegel, 1956, p.
93, as cited in Nobles & Cooper, 2013, p. 347)
This point of view has been used, like a Pavlov
reflex, to condition African people to think they are an
inferior race. Hegel (1956) went further to say, “at this
point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is
no historical part of the World; it has no movement or
development to exhibit” (p. 99) and he concluded, “what
we properly understand by Africa, is the Unhistorical,
Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere
nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the
threshold of the World’s History” (p. 99). Hegel strongly
believed that one cannot read anything an African writes
without seeing “anathema” all over it. Interestingly,
Hegel’s argument was also echoed by prominent African
scholars. Senghor (1964), a highly respected African
intellectual, stated, “L’ émotion est Nègre, comme la raison
est Héllène” (emotion is Negro, as reason is Hellenic; p.
288). Senghor, like Hegel, believed that a Black person
could not use his or her neocortex or rational mind because
s/he was still stuck in his/her reptilian brain and that
anything rational must come from Helena, the symbol
of Greece’s beauty and the cradle of Western rationalism
and civilization. Frantz Fanon, and later Eduardo Duran
and Bonnie Duran, in a different context but similar
idea, called such phenomenon “lactification,” a process
whereby any indigenous (Black/Brown person) must
obtain the approval of a White person in order to validate
his or her knowledge (Duran & Duran, 1995, p. 4;
Fanon, 1952, p. 47).
This way of thinking goes to show that the
non-recognition of the existence of an African history
and memory is similar to the non-recognition of the
existence of African knowledge and by extension
African-centered studies. This could also be called
“bad scholarship,” especially when it is known that
people have lived in Africa for more than three million
years and, therefore, should possess a rich and varied
history as illustrated by the Egyptian pyramids and
hieroglyphics, the ancient kingdoms of Zimbabwe,
Ghana, Mali, Congo, and others. Furthermore, Nobles
and Cooper gave the proper answer to Hegel’s distortion:
In spite of our Westernization, the antibody of our
common core ancestral cultural legacy has kept, to

70

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

a great extent, an African mind here and an African
mind there from being completely torn asunder.
Though extremely destructive, Hegel’s lie was and
is nothing more than a phantom (a bodiless energy
without real existence) that on closer examination
dissolves, yet tends to leave a lingering doubt about
its veracity, implanting its insinuation in a brake to
collective action. (Nobles & Cooper, 2013, p. 347)
One could make a cogent argument that
because African communities favor oral transmission
of knowledge, and that orally transmitted knowledge
may be altered or lost from generation to generation, it is
challenging to recognize and/or document their history.
The counter argument could also be that with research in
genetics, archeology, linguistics, and artifacts, one could
reconstruct or reclaim an African history, memory, and
knowledge. The question is who has the authority to
do that work and/or validate that knowledge. Africans
have been made to believe that it is not them. Senghor,
for example, believed that without France, Africa was
lost and in a speech said that Africans do not want to
leave the French compound, they have grown up in
it and it was good for them to be alive in it (Nugent,
2004). He then became the first African to be elected
in l’Académie Française. Later in his life, in a conscious
awakening, probably because of his disillusionment in
France, he realized the strong dominance of French
culture in Africa, and the perception that Africa did
not have culture developed enough to stand alongside
that of Europe. With Aimé Césaire and Léon Damas,
Senghor created the concept of Négritude, an important
intellectual movement that sought to assert and to
valorize what they believe to be distinctive African
characteristics, values, and aesthetics.
Négritude
Martiniquean poet Aimé Césaire, Léopold
Sédar Senghor, a future President of Senegal, and
Léon Damas of French Guiana, and others, created
Négritude as a literary and ideological philosophy in
the 1930s when the general mood among Blacks was
about the affirmation of Blackness and the fight for
the decolonization of African nations. These Africancentered scholars were dissatisfied and disgusted by
French colonialism and argued that the best strategy
to reject it was to encourage a common racial identity
for Black Africans worldwide, a Pan-African identity of
some sort. They intentionally chose the term Négritude
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and meant to be provocative by appropriating it, because
it came from Latin niger and was used exclusively in a
racist context within France when referring to Black
people. They maintained that Blacks did have a history
and a worthy culture, and that it was capable of standing
alongside the cultures of other countries as equals while,
at the same time, denouncing Europe’s alleged lack of
humanity, and the rejection of Western domination and
ideas.
Négritude became immediately controversial.
In 1948, Jean-Paul Sartre analyzed the Négritude
philosophy in an essay called “Orphée Noir” (Black
Orpheus) and characterized it as the opposite of colonial
racism in a Hegelian dialectic, a description of the
relationship between the master and the slave, and with
it, he helped to introduce Négritude issues to French
intellectuals as a valid academic contribution to his
existential theory. Sartre believed that Négritude was a
“racisme antiraciste” (anti-racist racism), a strategy with
a final goal of racial unity (p. xiv). Even some Black
scholars critiqued Négritude philosophy. The Nigerian
icon and 1986 Nobel Peace Prize, Wole Soyinka,
believed that by deliberately and outspokenly being
proud of their ethnicity, Black people were automatically
on the defensive and said, “Un tigre ne proclame pas sa
tigritude, il saute sur sa proie et la dévore” (a tiger does not
proclaim its tigritude (tigerness); it jumps on its prey and
devours it; as cited by Madinin-Art, 2006, para. 19). The
implication of Soyinka’s point is that one should be proud
of an achievement, being Black is not an achievement, but
it is a natural, essential, and existential fact. Following
the same logic, the South African Keorapetse Kgositsile
argued that the term was based too much on Blackness
according to a Caucasian aesthetic, and was unable to
define a new kind of perception of Africanness that
would free Black art from Caucasian conceptualizations
altogether (Kgositsile, 1968).
Related Concepts
It is important to note that an archaic use of the
term Négritude was identified much earlier in America
in the context of race. American physician, Benjamin
Rush, a signer of the United States Declaration of
Independence, used the term Négritude to imagine a
rhetorical “disease” which he said was a mild form of
leprosy whose only cure was to become White (Jackson,
2002). This early use of the term may not have been
known to Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, and Leopold
Sedar Senghor when they developed the Négritude

Consequently, and based on the complexity of
the topic, African-centered studies or African-centered
psychology presents many challenges created by a
stubborn denial of a well-established African history and
the existence of an African memory and past. Morrison
(1984) also made the case that some of Africans’ beliefs
and practices were “discredited knowledge,” discredited
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philosophy, but it only confirms the racial characteristic
of said term that the aforementioned scholars wanted to
expose.
It is also worth noting that the Négritude
philosophy developed alongside a few likeminded
movements, namely the Harlem Renaissance and
Noirisme. The Harlem Renaissance was the name given
to the cultural, social, and artistic explosion that took
place in Harlem between the end of World War I and the
middle of the 1930s. During that period, Harlem was
a cultural center, drawing Black writers, artists,
musicians, photographers, poets, scholars, and authors
(such as Claude McKay and Langston Hughes), who
laid groundwork for Black expression, which helped
to inspire Senghor, Damas and Césaire when they
developed Négritude. On the other hand, Noirisme
could be understood as radical, psychological, cultural,
ethnological and political ideology, which argued for
Black supremacy in Haitian politics. Although some
saw Noirisme as the Haitian version of Négritude,
most writers of the Négritude philosophy were quick to
distance themselves from Noirisme when they realized
the extent of its radicalism.
In an effort to respond to critics, the founders
of Négritude argued that their philosophy was by no
means an anti-White racism, but rather emphasized the
importance of dialogue and exchange among different
cultures, a point that was obviously rejected by Jean-Paul
Sartre. Nevertheless, Cheikh Anta Diop (1974), a giant
of African intellectualism, sounded the alarm a long time
ago, denouncing the double standard when critiquing
African scholars:
Have foreign intellectuals, who challenge our
intentions and accuse us of all kinds of hidden motives
or ridiculous ideas, proceeded any differently? When
they explain their own historical past or study their
languages, that seems normal. Yet, when an African
does likewise to help reconstruct the national
personality of his people, distorted by colonialism,
that is considered backward or alarming. (p. xiii)

only because Black people were discredited therefore
what they knew was “discredited” (p. 62).
The discredit of African knowledge is based on
criteria from other paradigms. Those criteria are mostly
predetermined frameworks of analysis developed from
predefined parameters by ways of Western categories
rather than the ones that emerge from Africans’ lived
experiences. This often results in a constant compareand-contrast analysis rather that an analysis in and
of itself. Defining African knowledge and concepts
parallel to Western concepts actually proceeds from and
reinforces an understanding of the dominant position
of the Euro-American culture and risks constructing an
African identity by its relationship to Western template.
This, in turn, might imply advocating the acceptance
of African worldview or ways of knowing in a Western
world. African wisdom and science represents a legitimate
mode of social and human science exploration, without
apology to Western exclusive way of knowing. The goal
should not be to have to base the existence or integrity of
African knowledge on an oppositional relationship, but
to find a language that is accessible to African and nonAfrican audiences. In order for this to happen, Africancentered scholars should be able to develop methods
and praxis capable of assessing and explaining the steps
involved in traditional healing sessions, describing mental
processes and behavior patterns as suggested in legends,
fables, folklore, folktale, movement, and symbols.
African-Centered Psychology and the
Transpersonal Dimension
iven the difficulty to define an African identity
as shown in Afrocentrism and Pan-Africanism,
the complexity of the relationship between Africans
of the diaspora and those on the continent, and the
need for an African-centered psychology, scholars from
the Association of Black Psychologists (ABPsi) have
attempted to develop a few theories and methods to
facilitate the conversation.
Theoretical Orientation
There is agreement among African-centered
scholars about the goal of an African-centered
psychology, which is the liberation of the African mind,
empowerment of the African character, and enlivenment
and illumination of the African spirit. However, the
theories and methods about how to achieve that goal
are different. Karenga (1992) has identified essentially
three main theoretical orientations: the traditional,
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the reformist, and the radical. According to Jamison
(2008) and Karenga (1992), the traditional theoretical
orientation is characterized by scholars who are not
necessarily interested in the existence and/or development
of African/Black psychology, but continue to support
“traditional” Eurocentric psychological models with
minor changes. Those scholars believe in changing
White attitudes by being critical of the models they
subscribe to without suggesting new approaches to solve
the problems.
The reformists have a more ideological
orientation. Like the traditional theoretical orientation,
the reformists also believe in changing White attitudes,
but focus on confronting public policies that maintain
and support institutional racism (Karenga, 1992). The
reformist theoretical orientation “tend[s] to emphasize the
American slavery legacies of the continuing oppression of
Blacks in America” (Kambon, 1998, p. 231). On the
other hand, the radical theoretical orientation is not
concerned with changing White attitudes. Members of
this orientation, Nobles (1974), Akbar (1994), Kambon
(1998), and others, believe that an African worldview
analysis is essential to understanding the psychology of
people of African descent, because an African-centered
psychology cannot be developed in a Euro-American
organization; therefore they need to return to African
values, philosophy, and psychology in order to develop
tools and instruments necessary to meet the needs of
Black people everywhere, thus marking a shift from
ideological ism to more cultural and methodological
praxis.
Methodological Perspective
The methods that deal with Black issues are as
complex as the issues themselves. Banks (1982) identified
those critical approaches or methods as deconstructive,
reconstructive, and constructive. The deconstructionists
denounce and expose the biases and weaknesses in the
scientific literature about Black people, but they stop
there. The reconstructionists take it a step further by
correcting those biases and by attempting to modify and
reconstruct existing models into more culturally relevant
models for Blacks (Kambon, 1998; Nobles, 1986). The
reconstructionist approach has been taken by scholars
such as White (1980), Hayes (1991), Savage and Adair
(1977), and Boykin (1979).
The constructionists have a more critical
approach to so-called empirical methods as they question
the argument that empiricism is the only valid way of
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knowing (Harrell, 1999; Kambon, 1992, 1998). They are
not very much interested in exposing or correcting biases
in the literature about Black people as much as they are
interested in researching and creating “new paradigms and
methodologies that stem from an organic, authentically
African epistemological and ontological base” (Harrell,
1999, p. 45). Constructionists are represented by such
scholars as Akbar (1981), Nobles (1973, 1986), Kambon
(1992) and Wilson (1978, 1991), Pasteur and Toldson
(1982), Azibo (1996) and Myers (1988).
From Ideological Ism to Praxis
African-centered psychology should move
beyond ideologies and away from the claim that people
have different ways of expressing themselves because of
their cultural and social experience, which is already
known extensively across disciplines. Instead, Africancentered scholars should focus more on praxis. In other
words, they should build upon the ideological “ism” and
adopt practical approaches to research, reflecting on how
they can articulate what they do in ways that are practical,
relevant, and that meet the needs and expectations of the
people concerned.
Such a move is perceptible in the radical
theoretical orientation and constructionist’s practical
inclination. For example, Akbar’s (1994) and Nobles’
(2013) ideas of redefining psychology as Sakhu Sheti and
Sakhu Sheti/Djaer, respectively, as a penetrating search and
understanding of phenomena both visible and invisible.
Nobles (2013), being one of the finest theoreticians in the
field, advocates the construction of an African version
of the Western Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DMS) that can describe the nosology
and nosography of African illnesses that are both visible
and invisible: “The development of an African-centered
classification of disease, that is, nosology, should at a
minimum (a) use African languages and logic and (b)
explore the application and relevance of these ideas and
notions in illuminating….‘the suffering of the spirit’” (p.
239). Through ABPsi, African-centered psychologists
and counselors have used African philosophical concepts
such as Ubuntu and different community healing
mechanisms to provide counsel to Black communities
suffering from police brutality and other forms of social,
political, economic oppression, and natural disasters in
America and elsewhere, for example, the Michael Brown
case in Ferguson or the victims of Haiti earthquake.
Though Nobles’ and others’ practical works are still in
progress, they are moving in the right direction.

A sense of community living, attachment to
cultural and ancestral values, and rhythm should be the
bridge that links Africans in the diaspora with those
on the continent and ought to be the basis upon which
research is done both in African-centered psychology
and transpersonal psychology. The conversation around
Afrocentrism, Pan-Africanism, and Négritude was an
example of the quest for connectedness and harmony
among Africans and African-descents around the world.
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Another move from ism to praxis is Kambon’s
(1992) African Self-Consciousness (ASC), African
Self-Extension Orientation (ASEO), and Cultural
Misorientation (CM) measures that have been used in
studies to show that African American college students
with an African worldview orientation do well in
academic self-concept than those with a Eurocentric
worldview orientation (Iyanu, 2013). Scholars are now
using this model to explain healing modalities based on
African cultures and traditional practices.
The Transpersonal Dimension
Early in this article, the concepts of Afrocentrism,
Pan-Africanism, and Négritude were discussed. The
common theme in these concepts was the idea of “Africa”
in African-centeredness. The question that emerges is
whether or not Africans both in the diaspora and on the
continent share the same psychological experience. After
all, most African-descents in the diaspora were born and
raised in the ambient culture, how do they then connect
with those on the continent? In addition to Nobles and
Cooper’s (2013) answer to Hegel mentioned earlier,
Asante (1984) had also suggested an answer to that
question in the following quote:
The African American is to a degree a most
Westernized African, yet has retained the Sudic
Ideal of harmony, achieved by rhythm, and passed
on to other cultures. There is a unique experience of
transcendence among Africans in the West, whether
they are Cubans, Brazilians, Haitians, Jamaicans,
Ecuadorians, or citizens of the United States; they
share forms of the same experience in Samba the
Brazilian dance, Sango the Cuban folk religion,
Umbanda the Brazilian folk religion, Voodoo
the Haitian folk religion, or Myal a Jamaican
religion. At the center of all of these forms of
human expression is the same source of energy, the
rhythm of polyrhythms that drive the spirit towards
transcendence. (p. 168)

Though their respective psychological experiences may
vary, they mostly rely on the following guiding principles
in the study of their lived experience:
1. Spirit permeates everything
2. Everything in the universe is interconnected
3. Collective/community living is the most
salient element of existence
4. Communal self-knowledge is the key to
mental health (Nobles, 2013, pp. 292293).
According to Myers (1988), an optimal African
worldview consists of: (a) viewing the spiritual and
material as one, (b) knowing the self through symbolic
imagery and rhythm, (c) valuing positive interpersonal
relationships among people, (d) emphasizing the
union of opposites, (e) processing the interrelatedness
of human and spiritual networks, (f) identifying the
extended self and the multidimensionality of self, (g)
assuming self-worth is intrinsic in being, (h) valuing
spiritualism, oneness with nature and communalism,
(i) being positively consistent despite appearances due to
relationship with the source, and (j) having a life space
that is infinite and unlimited (pp. 11-12).
Moreover, it is Diop’s Two Cradle Theory that
summarizes best the main principles of the African
worldview upon which is based the quest for harmony,
connectedness, and transcendence: ancestor/spirit
veneration, social collectivity, and spiritual basis of
existence (Wobogo, 1976). In other words, a more
appropriate approach to African-centered psychology
and mode of transcendence includes “introspection
and inclusion of constructs related to the soul and
spirit and the centrality of such cultural constructs as
interdependence, connection to nature, social collectivity
in defining human functioning, and the consubstantial
nature of things in the world” (Grills, 2002, p. 22).
Comparatively, transpersonal psychology might
provide a platform that is outside of the ideological
divisions within African-centered psychology and be
more conducive to this area of study than mainstream
psychology or religious study. The scholarly field of
transpersonal psychology embraces the spectrum of
human affairs: spirituality, consciousness, culture,
language, gender (Puhakka, 2008). It also attempts
to integrate timeless wisdom with Western modern
psychology and translate spiritual principles into
scientifically grounded, contemporary language (Caplan,
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2009). Within such a framework, African-centered
scholars can scientifically ground the study of African
core principles such as ancestor/spirit veneration, social
collectivity, and the spiritual basis of existence.
Practical Application and Relevance of Africa’s Past
Building on transpersonal psychology’s
framework and platform, African-centered scholars
should be motivated by the aforementioned African
core principles and reclaim Africa’s past. Africa’s past
is based on the Kemetic notion of what it means to be
a human. The Kemetic or ancient Egyptian knowledge
presents three essential modalities within every human
being, which are ka, ba, and sad (Mayi, 2010). Ka is a
person viewed as a specific modality of an individualized
cosmic being, which is universal and eternal. In other
words, ka represents the psycho-affective and psychocognitive aspects of human beings, which are immortal
and eternal. Ba is viewed as a person in terms of his or her
moving capability, which means that ba is the entity that
can move in and out of the body independently. From a
purely biological perspective, ba is also viewed as blood
and to some extent race, family, character, and so forth.
Sad is the living body, which decomposes after death.
It should be noted that each modality comprises
an element of mortality and immortality. This represents
the Kemetic principle of duality, which allows for multiple
readings of the patient’s condition while considering
the fact that a person is destined to eternal life and is
mortal, therefore susceptible to corruption (Mayi,
2010). According to Mayi, duality is not conflictual,
ka, ba, and sad co-exist and their co-existence creates
a vital energy that affects both the psyche and the
body. When the therapist understands this duality, he
or she will be able to assess a patient who presents with
psychosomatic illness. This duality can also be observed
in Freud’s concepts of libido, Eros, and Thanatos coexisting within the individual, except that for Freud, the
duality is conflictual. African-centered scholars can use
the Kemetic principle of duality, as described above, to
develop practical approaches to mental health and move
beyond ideologies.
Conclusion
istory, memory, and past are essential parts of
an African-centered psychology and mode of
transcendence. Denying the existence of an African
history is a crime against memory. It is a discreet crime
because of its subtle nature. Yet, such a crime paves
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the way for cultural hegemony where one cultural bloc
dominates the other and creates conditions for cultural
blocs, risking total annihilation of the dominated culture.
There can be no African psychology without an African
history, memory, and past. To speak, then, of an African
psychology, it is important, even imperative, to excavate
its past, exhume its memory, and rehabilitate its history.
However, the challenge in the establishment of
a viable and relevant African-centered psychology is to
retrain and reeducate psychologists, not necessarily to
unlearn their Euro-American psychology, but to consider
African traditional thought, spirituality, and knowledge
as valid scientific enterprise. In so doing, Africancentered scholars can then move beyond ideological
ism and develop more appropriate praxis to serve the
communities concerned.
Ultimately, African-centered scholars still
need to address their differences in thought processes,
geographic experiences, cultural philosophies, beliefs,
and worldviews in order to present evidence of the
relevance of their scholarly contributions. This implies
developing appropriate research methods that reflect the
diversity and complexity of their thoughts, introducing
new concepts and themes that articulate their experience
and research findings, and finally describe and implement
a clear nosology and nosography of their mental health
related diagnoses.
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